

Distr.
GENERAL

الجمعية العامة



A/HRC/2/G/8
25 September 2006

ARABIC
Original: ENGLISH

مجلس حقوق الإنسان
الدورة الثانية
البند ٢ من جدول الأعمال

تنفيذ قرار الجمعية العامة ٢٥١/٦٠ المؤرخ ١٥ آذار/مارس ٢٠٠٦
المعنون "مجلس حقوق الإنسان"

مذكرة شفوية مؤرخة ٢٠ أيلول/سبتمبر ٢٠٠٦ موجهة من البعثة الدائمة للسودان لدى
مكتب الأمم المتحدة في جنيف إلى أمانة مجلس حقوق الإنسان

تُهدي البعثة الدائمة لجمهورية السودان لدى مكتب الأمم المتحدة والمنظمات الدولية الأخرى في جنيف
تحياتها إلى أمانة مجلس حقوق الإنسان، وتتشفّر بأن تُحيل للعلم طي هذه المذكرة، ورقة معنونة "معلومات أساسية عمّا
سبق القرار ١٧٠٦ بشأن دارفور الصادر عن مجلس الأمن بالأمم المتحدة".*

وإذ تطلب البعثة الدائمة لجمهورية السودان إلى أمانة مجلس حقوق الإنسان تعميم هذه الورقة كوثيقة رسمية من
وثائق الدورة الثانية لمجلس حقوق الإنسان، تتغنم هذه الفرصة لتعرب لأمانة المجلس مرة أخرى عن فائق تقديرها.

* استنسخت هذه الورقة في المرفق كما وردت، باللغة التي قُدمت بها فقط.

Annex

Background to the United Nations Security Council resolution 1706
on Darfur

1. On 30th August, 2006, well before the resolution 1706 of the Security Council on the replacement of the troops of the African Union in Darfur by international troops, the Sudan sent to the President of the Council a letter informing of its openness to conducting talks on Darfur prior to the issuance of any resolution.
2. But the Security Council opted for adoption of the aforementioned resolution instead of concentrating on consultation with all of the concerned parties, a matter which is necessitated by the requirements of taking the right decision that can be implemented in a manner conducive to the prevalence of peace and security.
3. The facts reveal that preparations for the adoption of the resolution commenced long before the decision by the Council. It was in November 2005, six months before the conclusion of the Abuja Agreement, when some donor countries discontinued payment of their obligations towards the AU troops. Also, in December 2005, Assistant to the US Secretary of State shuttle-toured Africa in pursuit of postponing the convocation of the African Summit and excluding Khartoum to be venue for it.
4. In a meeting of the African Council of Peace and Security that was held on 12th January, 2006, an item on the transfer of the mandate of the AU troops to the United Nations was included unexpectedly in the agenda. The decision taken on the item was that the Council accepted in principle the transfer on three conditions:
 - a) that this takes place if no peace agreement is reached,
 - b) if funding is not procured,
 - c) that the Government of Sudan agrees to the transfer.
5. On 10th March, 2006, the African Peace and Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the African troops until 30 September, 2006, angering the US representative in the Security Council who issued a statement contending that this Council would authorize the transfer irrespective of the position of the African Council of Peace and Security.
6. On 30th April, 2006, Tanzania proposed a draft resolution to the Security Council calling for support to the peace negotiations and encouragement of the parties to reach agreement. Instead of passing the draft resolution, it was postponed and another draft resolution containing sanctions against Sudanese officials was proposed. These manoeuvres posed real obstacles to the peace negotiations in Abuja. But due to the solid African position, the negotiations were concluded successfully and the Abuja peace agreement was signed on 5th May, 2006.
7. However, the negative signals from some members of the Security Council encouraged some of the armed groups to refrain from signing the agreement.

8. Following from the signing of the agreement, the Security Council issued an ultimatum to the parties rejecting the agreement to sign it or face sanctions. Four months have now elapsed without either the Security Council or the peace partners ever moving to effect the said sanctions. On the contrary, attempts are now made to supply the intransigent groups with arms and funds, besides the de facto recognition, political support and disregard of the serious violations perpetrated by these groups, including, for example, the recent killing of one of the officers of the ICRC.
9. The Sudan persevered in its cooperation with the United Nations and the international community to reinforce the Abuja peace agreement. During the AU summit of Banjule, the President of Sudan met with Secretary-General Kofi Anan and they agreed that the Sudan submit to the United Nations a specific plan for Darfur by 1st August, 2006. The Sudan did submit this plan on time. Yet, before its being studied by the United Nations and replied to by the Secretary-General, statements had been issued by US officials, bearing the judgement that the plan was rejected.
10. Nine days after receipt of the mentioned plan, i.e. on 9th August 2006, the Secretary-General requested to conduct consultations on it with the Sudan Minister for Foreign Affairs. A few hours later, the UK tabled its draft resolution, preempting the results of the consultations.
11. The President of the Security Council addressed messages to the Sudanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chairman of the African Commission, the Secretary-General of the Arab League and the Secretary-General of the OIC. Some of these distinguished addressees requested more time for consultation on the matter in New York, but this was denied. The draft resolution of the UK was put to vote hurriedly, and the representative of the UK alleged in the Council that the Sudan was adamant and uncooperative with the international community. She even told the absolutely false incident of the refusal of the President of Sudan to grant audience to a British Minister then present in Khartoum to discuss the issue.
12. The aforementioned Darfur plan of Sudan, which was never discussed, includes an integrated programme for the restoration of stability and protection of civilians.
13. The conditions of the AU for the transfer of the mandate of the African troops have not been satisfied, which lends credibility to and justifies the Sudanese position that the African troops continue their noble mission. As concerns funding, it should be noted that the cost of deploying international troops in Darfur, according to the United Nations Secretary-General, amounts to US dollars 1.7 billion, whereas that of maintaining the African troops is but US dollars 460 million, a sum the communications to secure which, have already been made. In this regard, it should be recalled that the root cause of the conflict in Darfur is economic and development related. Were the sum needed for the international troops spent on the economic development of the region, the conflict would have been done away with effectively.
