Puntos de vista recibidos de varias organizaciones como Amici Curiae - International League for Human Rights & Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights (inglĂ©s Ășnicamente)
Marvin E. Frankel, Michael Posner, Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights
Jerome J. Shestack, Roger Clark, Nina Shea, International League for Human Rights
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE COURT IN THIS CASE
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT.
I. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties should be applied
II. It is Evident in Satisfaction of the Requirement of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention that the "object and purposes" of the American Convention are to further the Goals of Global Human Rights Instruments
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.
III. An Examination of the Preparatory Work on the American Convention Clearly Shows that the Drafters Intended that the Court Should Have Advisory Jurisdiction over All Treaties to Which American States are Parties
IV. A Broad Interpretation of Article 64 to Include Global Treaties is Consistent with United Nations Doctrine
V. Conclusions
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether under Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights the advisory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights extends to all treaties to which one or more American States are parties?
PRELIMINARY
STATEMENT:
This case concerns the advisory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. In June 1982, the government of Peru requested the Court to
interpret Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights. It provides,
in part:
The member states of the Organization may consult the Court regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American states.
(Emphasis added).
At issue is whether
the phrase "other treaties concerning the protection of human rights
in the American states," should include all treaties to which one or
more American States are parties.
The International League for Human Rights and the Lawyers Committee for International
Human Rights contend that Article 64 empowers the Court to interpret all treaties
to which American States are parties, including those of the United Nations.
This brief is submitted in support of our position.
INTEREST
OF AMICI CURIAE.
The Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights (the "Lawyers Committee")
is a non-governmental human rights organization. Founded in 1975, the Lawyers
Committee seeks to promote respect for international human rights law and
legal principles. The lawyers Committee serves as a legal resource center
for various human rights organizations in the United States and elsewhere.
In the last several years, the Lawyers Committee has prepared various reports
on international human rights violations in specific countries, including
reports that have been submitted to the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights.
The Lawyers Committee has also submitted several amicus curiae briefs
in various federal courts in the United States, urging the utilization of
international human rights provisions in domestic U. S. cases.
The Chairman of the Lawyers Committee is Marvin. E. Frankel.
The International League for Human Rights (the "League"), is an
international, non-governmental human rights organization. Founded in 1942,
the League has consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations and with UNESCO, ILO and the Council of Europe. In the
last several years, League representatives attended the General Assembly meetings
of the OAS. Currently, the League has 40 affiliates in 30 countries, including
six in Member States of the OAS.
Of the reports on human rights violations prepared by the Lague in recent
years, several have been submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights for consideration. In January 1981, the League submitted comments to
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the Court's Rules of Procedure.
The President of the International League is Jerome J. Shestack.
Both the Lawyers Committee and the League are committed to the development
of the Inter-American system, including an effective and independent Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. This brief is submitted to assist the Court in formulating
its operating procedures.
AMICUS
CURIAE BRIEFS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE COURT IN THIS
CASE:
The amicus curiae brief is primarily a common law institution although
it was said to exist in Roman law and has found limited use in at least one
civil law country, France. (Angell, The Amicus Curiae:
American Development of English Institutions, 16 Int'l and Comp. L.Q.
1017 (1967); Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From
Friendship to Advocary, 72 Yale Law Journal 694 (1963).) The value
of amicus briefs has been succinctly stated by Professor W. Michael
Reisman of Yale Law School in correspondence with the Registrar of the International
Court of Justice:
In common law countries, the amicus curiae brief has been an institution which has provided useful information to courts, permitted private parties who were not litigating to inform the court of their views and the probable effects the outcome might have on them and, overall, has served as a means for integrating and buttressing the authority and conflict-resolving capacities of domestic tribunals.
(I.C.J., Pleadings, legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) Volume II at 636-37.)
In a number of important
recent United States cases involving international human rights law, significant
contributions have been made by amici. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980); Doe v. Plyler, 628 F. 2d 448 (5th Cir.
1980), ____ U.S. ____ (1982); Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti,
503 F. Supp. 442, (S.D. Fla., 1980), aff'd sub nom.; Haitian Refugee Center
v. Smith, F.2nd ____ (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982); Rodriguez Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
654 F. 2d 1382 (10 th Cir. 1981). This is not a new development; perhaps the
first United States amicus brief raising questions of international
human rights law (particularly the United Nations Charter), was submitted
in the case of Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948), the landmark
Supreme Court case on racially restrictive covenants. An amicus brief
was presented in that case by the American Association for the United Nations.
Its authors were a notable group, including Alger Hiss, Phillip C. Jessup,
Joseph M. Proskauer, and Myles S. McDougal.
There is nothing in the Statute or the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American
Court which explicitly permits or prevents the filing of such briefs. Yet
the powers of the Court under Article 60 of the American Convention to "adopt
its own Rules of Procedure" and under Article 1, paragraph 2, of the
Rules to "adopt such other Rules as are necessary to carry out its functions"
provide ample authority for the Court to permit the filing of such documents.
In urging the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs in this case, we
do not suggest that the rights to file such briefs should be automatic. The
Court can and should exercise discretion as to which material it will receive.
As it begins to hear more cases, the Court will be able to develop guidelines
in the light of its experience. We note that the United States Supreme Court
permitted the filing of amicus briefs in the exercise of its instrinsic
powers as early as 1904, even though it did not adopt a written rule on the
subject until 1937. (Krislov, supra at 694 and 707.) Some
indication of the importance of such briefs to minority groups is shown by
the fact that the 1904 filing was by an organization known as the Chinese
Charitable and Benevolent Association of New York and many of the early briefs
filed in the United States Supreme Court were on behalf of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People.
From the outset, the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International
Court of Justice had specific powers to permit international non-governmental
organizations to furnish information concerning the subject matter of advisory
opinions. The current provision is contained in Article 66, paragraph 2, of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice. It was formerly contained
in Article 73 of the Rules of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
provides:
The Registrer shall also, by means of a special and direct communication, notify any state entitled to appear before the Court or international organization considered by the Court, or should it not be sitting, by the President, as likely to be able to furnish information on the question, that the Court will be prepared to receive, within a time limit to be fixed by the President, written statements, or to hear, at a public sitting to be held for the purpose, oral statements relating to the question.
The International
Court of Justice has interpreted this language to permit it to receive statements
from an international non-governmental organization, specifically the International
League for Human Rights (I.C.J., Pleadings, International Status of South
West Africa (1950) at 327; also see Clark, Roger, The International
League for Human Rights and South West Africa 1947-1957: The Human Rights
NGO as Catalyst in the International Legal Process, 3(4) Human Rights
Quarterly, 101 at 120-22 (1981).)
Unfortunately, this procedure is all too seldom invoked in the practice of
the International Court of Justice. It was often used by the Permanent Court
of International Justice particularly in proceedings involving the interpretation
of International Labor Organization documents. In fact, when it was called
upon to render its very first advisory opinion in 1922, the Permanent Court
decided to permit participation by any international organization (clearly
including non-governmental organizations) which expressed the No. 1, Series
C, No. 1 at 5, 449 (1922); Series B, No. 1 at 11 (1922); K. Keith, The
Extent of the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
189-190 (1971).) This precedent was followed in several subsequent cases.
(Clark, supra at 121 note 82.)
We would submit, however, that the scope of Article 66, paragraph 2, of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice is too narrow in two respects.
First, Article 66 refers to material from an "international organization."
This limitation seems to explain the decisions of the Court in the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal Case, ((1954) I.C.J. 47), where the Court
declined to hear from counsel who had represented staff members of the United
Nations in proceedings before the United Nations Administrative Tribunal.
(Also see remarks in Advisory Opinion, "Judgments of the Administrative
Tribunal of the ILO upon complaints made against UNESCO," (1956), I.C.J.
77 at 80, 109 and 114). We would suggest that the Inter-American Court not
limit itself to the receipt of material from international organizations.
In the human rights context, there are many national human rights organizations
not necessarily affiliated with appropriate international organizations that
have a significant stake in being permitted to make observations concerning
particular issues before the Court. While it is not limited to such cases,
this may be particularly so regarding opinions rendered to a member state
under Article 64, paragraph 2, of the American Convention on the compatibility
of domestic laws with international human rights instruments. It also should
be noted that, on occasion, the Permanent Court of International Justice has
received material from national groups, but apparently has not directed its
attention as to whether this was is accordance with the Court's Rules. (See
Clark, supra, 121 note 82, But cf., Series C, No. 1 at 449 (1922)
where permission for participation by a national organization was refused
on the basis that the Court's decision to receive material extended only to
international organizations.)
There is a second area in which the Inter-American Court should expand on
the practice of the International Court of Justice. The experience of the
International Court of Justice is limited to the receipt of amicus
material concerning advisory proceedings. Article 34 of its Statute, as well
as the prior provisions concerning the Permanent Court of International Justice,
state that in contentious proceedings the views of "public international
organizations" may be received. The difference between the reference
to "international organizations" in Article 66 and "public"
international organizations in Article 34 is a significant one in that it
precludes non-governmental organizations from participating in Article 34
proceedings. We submit that amicus briefs are equally helpful in
cases brought under the general jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court (contained
in Article 62 of the American Convention) as they are under its power to render
advisory opinions pursuant to Article 64.
SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT:
The ultimate question before this Court is how Article 64 of the American
Convention on Human Rights should be interpreted. As this is a case of first
impression, there are no precedential cases to guide the Court in making its
decision. Instead, it should rely principally on the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention requires that a treaty provision should
be interpreted in the context of the whole treaty and "in light of its
object and purpose." Here, it is clear that the object and purpose of
the American Convention on Human Rights is to promote internationally recognized
human rights principles, through the OAS, a regional organization. The Preamble
to the Convention makes explicit references to the U.N. Universal Declaration
of Human Rights; its provisions closely track the U.N. Covenants of Civil
and Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Accordingly,
Article 64 should be interpreted as permitting the Court to exercise advisory
jurisdiction in interpreting all international human rights treaties that
bind OAS member states. Alternatively, if the Court is not persuaded that
the test of Article 31 has been met, Article 32 provides that ambiguous language
should be evaluated using supplementary means of interpretation including
the preparatory work of the treaty. Under this test there can be little doubt
that the drafters of the American Convention intended Article 64 to give the
Court broad jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions on treaties outside the
OAS, and particularly treaties of the United Nations.
ARGUMENTS
I. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES SHOULD BE APPLIED.
In examining the
meaning of Article 64, the Court has no prior cases to guide it. As a result
it should review the question utilizing the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties as its guide. The Vienna Convention is widely recognized as customary
international law in this area. (See Legal Consequences for States
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (S.W. Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Res. 276 (1970) 1971 I.C.J. 16 at 47.)
The American Convention explicitly recognizes the Vienna Convention as the
standard by which it will interpret all reservations by States parties (Article
75). In interpreting Article 64 in the present case, the Vienna Convention
represents the most appropriate authority on which the Court should rely.
II. IT IS EVIDENT IN SATISFACTION OF THE REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE 31 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION THAT THE "OBJECT AND PURPOSE" OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ARE TO FURTHER THE GOALS OF GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS.
Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention requires that the object and purpose of a treaty must be
evaluted in interpreting a treaty provision.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states that:
a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
In analyzing the
American Convention as a whole, it is clear, as explicitly stated in the preamble,
that its "object and purpose" is to cooperate with the United Nations
in promoting fundamental principles of human rights.
According to its first preambular paragraph, the purpose of the Convention
is to "consolidate in this hemisphere, within the framework of democratic
institutions, a system of personal liberty and social justice based on respect
for the essential rights of man." In elucidating this concept, the preamble
makes two explicit references to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and another to "other instruments, worldwide as well as regional in scope."
Moreover, the substantive provisions of the treaty closely correspond to those
of the United Nations International Covenant on Human Rights (See Legislative
History, supra). Chapter II of the Convention (Articles 3 through
25) setting forth civil and political rights substantially parallels the guarantees
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 26 incorporates
the economic, social and cultural standards that are established in the OAS
Charter as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires. These accord with the
standards contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. In addition, the implementation clause in Article 26 of the
Convention, calls for the "progressive" realization of these rights,
adopting the United Nations' approach to this issue as well.
Thus, the object purpose of the American Convention as explicitly stated in
its preamble and as evident from the substantive content of its text, are
to further the goals set forth in the basic human rights instruments of the
United Nations.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
III. AN EXAMINATION OF THE PREPARATORY WORK ON THE AMERICAN CONVENTION CLEARLY SHOWS THAT THE DRAFTERS INTENDED THAT THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OVER ALL TREATIES TO WHICH AMERICAN STATES ARE PARTIES.
Alternatively, on
the basis that the text is either ambiguos or its meaning needs confirmation,
this Court may decide to interpret Article 64 by examining the preparatory
work of the Convention. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides for such
analysis as a supplementary means of interpreting treaty language.
In this case, the specific documentation of the travaux preparatoires
of the American Convention offers little guidance in interpreting the meaning
of the phrase, "treaties concerning the protection of human rights in
the American states". (See Buergenthal, Thomas, The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, 76 Am. J. Int'l L. 231, 242, April 1982). However,
a review of the total drafting context of the Convention does provide some
important insights regarding the intent of the drafters. This context indicates,
for example, that the drafters were not only cognizant of the United Nations
International Human Rights Covenants, but had the explicit goal of furthering
these international norms by drawing up a complementary set of principles
to be given effect through the regional OAS structure.
The American Convention on Human Rights has its origins in the Fifth Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics,
held in 1959 in Santiago, Chile. This conference produced a resolution directing
the Inter-American Council of Jurists (IACJ), an organ of the OAS Council,
to prepare a draft convention on human rights. (Res. VIII, Fifth Meeting of
Consultation). At a second meeting held in Santiago, shortly after the Fifth
Consultation, the IACJ prepared and approved a draft convention on human rights.
The draft Convention incorporated substantive provisions relating to civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights and provisions for enforcement
procedurs in a single instrument. It was based in large part on the prior
efforts of the United Nations and the Council of Europe.
(See Res. XXIV, No. 1965, Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights
(1968) at 70.) The substantive provisions closely parallel those of the International
Covenants on Human Rights: the enumeration of individual guarantees (Articles
2-19 substantially accorded with those found in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights; the provisions on economic, social and cultural
rights adopted by the IACJ (Articles 20-33) generally corresponded to those
embodied in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
and the "measures of implementation," (Articles 34-81), providing
for an Inter-American Commission for the Protection of Human Rights and an
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, are clearly modeled on the institutional
machinery of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (See Cabranes, Jose A., The Protection of
Human Rights by the OAS, 62 Am. J. Int'l L. 889, Oct. 1968).
In 1965, the Second Special Inter-American Conference agreed to send the IACJ
draft, together with draft conventions presented by the governments of Chile
and Uruguay, to the Council of the OAS in order to complete the draft. (Activities
of IACHR (1965-1969), OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 23, 2/23/71.) In May 1966, the OAS Council
approved a resolution to transmit the draft to the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR) for its opinions and recommendations. At its meeting
on May 5, 1967, the Committee on Juridical-Political Affairs of the OAS Council
noted that on December 16, 1966 the United Nations General Assembly approved
an International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, an International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and its Optional Protocol, which had
been signed by a number of American states. The Council, at the Committee's
request, consulted the Member States on the following matters:
1. Whether the governments of the American states, in approving, at the Twenty-First Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Resolutions A, B, and C, concerning the International Covenants on Human Rights, wished to have a single universal system of regulation of human rights; or whether on the contrary they contemplated the possibility of the coexistence and coordination of the worldwide and regional convention on the same rights.
2. Whether, in the latter case, those governments consider that the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights provided for in article 112 of the Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States should be limited to establishing an Inter-American institutional and procedural system for the protection of those rights that would include the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and, eventually, and Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
(Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights (1966) at 81.)
After such consultation
took place, the IACHR, at its 17th Session, noted that the majority of the
States which had answered the inquiry had been in favor of continuing the
work on an Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. (For the text of the
government replies, see Id. at 81-87.) The IACHR then requested the
Secretariat to undertake a comparative study of the IACJ draft and the United
Nations International Covenants on Human Rights. On the basis of the Secretariat's
Comparative Study, the Council adopted a resolution requesting the IACHR to
"draw up a revised and complete text of a preliminary draft convention"
and that "that text be in harmony with the International covenants of
the United Nations." (OEA/Ser.G/IV-C-i-837 Rev.3, June 12, 1968.)
To carry out this mandate, the Commission convened its 19th Special Session
in Washington, D.C., from July 1-11, 1968. At this session, on the basis of
the Comparative Study, as well as government recommendations and its own opinions,
the IACHR revised the IACJ's draft to include a separate article providing
for the consultative jurisdiction of the Court. The Article, No. 53, stated
as follows:
The General Assembly, the Permanent Council, and the Commission may consult the Court concerning the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American States; and the States Parties may consult the Court concerning the compatibility of any of their domestic law with the aforesaid international instruments.
This was the first
provision ever included in any of the OAS drafts which empowered the Court
with advisory jurisdiction. The phrase, "other treaties concerning the
protection of human rights in the American States" originated in the
draft and has been incorporated without change into the final Convention.
In light of these actions, there can be little doubt that the provision establishing
the consultative jurisdiction of the Court, containing the phrase at issue,
is a reference to global human rights treaties, particularly the United Nations
International Covenants on Human Rights: there was a general concern in the
OAS regarding the relationship between the proposed American Convention and
the UN treaties on human rights; the Commission drafters, themselves, had
directd that a study comparing the IACJ draft and the United Nation's Covenants
be undertaken; the request for continuing the work on the Inter-American draft
even though a number of American States had already become Parties to the
United Nations Covenants was ratified by the majority of American States which
expressed an opinion on this issue; the Commission was sent a directive from
the OAS Council to draft the convention so that it would be "in harmony
with the International Covenants of the United Nations"; the Commission
in fact completed the draft one year later; the Commission relied, at least
partially, on the comparative study in adding the provision on the consultative
jurisdiction of the Court containing the phrase in question; and, furthermore,
no other American treaty was being contemplated and discussed with any comparable
concern within the OAS drafting bodies at the time. Finally, in its annotations
of the draft, the IACHR, commenting on the newly adopted Article 53, stated;
In accordance with the decision of the Commission to establish in the Preliminary Draft the consultative jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for interpretation of the Convention or of any other treaty concerning human rights in the American States, the provision that appears as Article 53 of that draft was approved.
(Emphasis added).
(OEA/Ser.L/V/II/.19, 2/11/69).
The use of the term
"any" in the Commission's comments indicates an intent to apply
a broad interpretation to the phrase it modifies, "other treaty concerning
human rights in the American States."
The Council of the OAS adopted the Preliminary Draft prepared by the Commission
(Resolution of October 2, 1968). It covened the historic Inter-American Specialized
Conference on Human Rights in San Jose, Costa Rica, from November 7-22, 1969,
at which the final draft of the document was prepared and the American Convention
was at last adopted.
The final draft of the Convention was also the product of international efforts.
Advisors to the San Jose Conference included representatives of the United
Nations and its specialized agencies such as the United Nations Office of
the High Commissioner for Refugees, UNESCO and ILO. Also present as observer-advisers
were two justices of the European Court of Human Rights, and the director
of the Human Rights Division of the Council of Europe. Not only did the conferees
have the benefit of the experience and precedents of the European and United
Nations treaties on human rights but some of the participants had themselves
participated in and written studies on these prior drafting efforts.
At the San Jose Conference, Article 64 of the Convention, which corresponds
to Article 53 of the draft, was broadened to extend the right to consult the
court for interpretation to all the organs of the OAS as well as to all OAS
Member States. This liberalization of standing for requesting advisory opinions
was in keeping with the trend throughout the drafting process of broadening
the consultative jurisdiction of the Court. This too supports the contention
that the drafters intended a broad interpretation of this provision.
IV. A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 64 TO INCLUDE GLOBAL TREATIES IS CONSISTENT WITH UNITED NATIONS DOCTRINE.
Article 52 of the United Nations Charter stipulates:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
The Charter recognizes
interdependence of the protection of human rights and the "maintenance
of international peace and security." Although the Chartes does not specifically
allocate responsibility for enforcing human rights standards between regional
organizations and the United Nations, this provision clearly does contemplate
that such a division of responsibility may occur.
A significant step in that direction was taken in the Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 5 of the
Protocol requires that the Human Rights Committee, the body empowered to monitor
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
abstain from considering a matter that is "being examined under another
procedure for international investigation or settlement." As one international
legal scholar observed, "this provision...would appear to grant an individual
in a state that had accepted the enforcement procedures of both a regional
convention and the United Nations Covenants an initial choice of regional
or global forum." (Cabranes, Jose A., The Protection of Human Rights
by the OAS, 62 Am. J. Int'l L., 889, 905, October 1968).
In more general terms, the role of regional organizations in ensuring the
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms has been a concern of
various United Nations bodies since the inception of the Organization.
Although a number of early United Nations' studies concerned the efforts of
national organizations, at the time of the adoption of the International Covenants
on Human Rights in 1966, the United Nations undertook its first serious examination
on the role of regional organizations in safeguarding human rights. At its
August 1966 session, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
adopted a resolution to cooperatte with regional inter-governmental bodies
concerned with human rights. The resolutions requested the Secretary-General
to arrange for an exchange of information on matters relating to human rights
between the United Nations Human Rights Commission and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the Council of Europe, the Organization of African
Unity and other regional bodies particularly concerned with human rights (ECOSOC
Res. 115 (XLI) adopted at the 1445th plenary meeting of the Council on 5 August
1966). That year, the General Assembly also called for an examination of the
establishment of regional commissions on human rights (General Assembly Res.
2200 (XXI) of 16 December 1966).
In 1967 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights expressed its belief
that "it is timely to give encouragement to the formation of regional
commissions on human rights within or outside the United Nations system."
(Res. 6. (XXIII), Commission on Human Rights, U.N. ECOSOC, 42nd Sess., Official
Records, Supp. No.6 at 125, 126, E/4322, E/CN.4/940, 1967). It did so in an
ad hoc Study Group "to study in all its aspects the proposal to
establish regional commissions on human rights within the United Nations family...."
/U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/966, Jan 26, 1968). In 1968, after considering the report
of the ad hoc Study Group, the Commission requested the Secretary
General to consider the possibility of arranging suitable regional seminars
in those areas where no regional commission on human rights existed to discuss
the usefulness of the establishment of such commissions. Such a seminar, focusing
on the establishment of an African regional human rights commission, took
place in September 1969 in Cairo.
In 1977, the United Nations General Assembly reviewed the question of regional
arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights. It adopted
a resolution appealing to States "in areas where regional arrangements
in the field of human rights do not yet exist to consider agreements with
a view to the establishment within their respective regions of suitable regional
machinery for the promotion and protection of human rights."
(Res. 32/127 of 16 Dec. 1977).
In September 1979, a United Nations Seminar on the Establishment of Regional
Commissions on Human Rights with special reference to Africa was held at Monrovia.
At the seminar, proposals for setting up an African Commission on Human Rights
were adopted, resulting in the drafting of an OAU "Charter of Human and
People's Rights" in 1981.
In resolutions adopted in 1979, 1980 and 1981, the United Nations General
Assembly reiterated its policy of encouraging the establishment of regional
human rights mechanisms. (Res. 34/171, 17 Dec. 1979; Res. 35/197, 15 Dec.
1980; Res. 36/154, 16 Dec. 1981).
In 1982, the most recent United Nations seminar on the establishment of regional
commissions on human rights was held, with special reference to Asia, in Colombo,
Sri Lanka.
The United Nations' consistent position of encouraging the development of
regional human rights mechanisms over the past some 15 years leads to the
conclusion that the United Nations has anything but pre-empted regional bodies
in human rights matters and is likely to welcome a broad reading of Article
64 on the Inter-American Court's advisory jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSIONS
For the reasons stated, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights should interpret
Article 64 to allow advisory jurisdiction in any treaty one or more American
States are parties.