Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring - Chapter XXIV: Security
CONTENTS
A. Introduction
C. Security within a human rights field operation
2. Appointment of security officers
4. Identification and visibility of human rights officers
7. Road blocks and other contacts with armed groups
8. Mines
10. Driving
11. General dress and behaviour restrictions
13. Emergency plans, knowing where to go
14. Health
15. Property
b. UN property
Appendix I to Chapter XXIV: Personal Data Form
Appendix II: Inventory of Personal Belongings
1. Human rights operations are often conducted in countries or regions where the security of HROs may be placed at risk. This Chapter deals with the security of HROs and other staff. Other chapters (see, e.g., Chapter VII- "Information-Gathering", Chapter VIII - "Interviewing") discuss the need and methods for preserving the security of witnesses and the various individuals with whom the human rights operation should be in contact. Unless the HROs can be secure, however, they will be unable to assist or protect others. Indeed, if HROs are beaten, kidnapped, or even killed, the UN operation cannot work effectively and may need, in extreme circumstances, to be closed.
This Chapter provides an overview of the main security issues related to human rights officers working in United Nations field operations. Readers are also referred, for more guidance, to the booklet "Security in the Field - Information for staff members of the United Nations system", issued by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (1).
2. The principal legal guarantee for the security of HROs is the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. 15, corrigendum 90 U.N.T.S. 327, entered into force 14 December 1946. For the 136 nations which have ratified the treaty, it provides security and immunity from legal process for the premises, property, documents, officials, and experts of the United Nations. That treaty implements Article 105 of the UN Charter, which states that officials of the United Nations shall "enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization."
3. Either the agreement between the host country and the UN human rights operation or the UN action establishing the operation ordinarily contains several protections for the staff of the operation, including the right to travel anywhere in the territory, to visit any facility, to speak with any person, to establish an office where appropriate, etc. In regard to any particular operation, it is critical to determine whether the Government has ratified the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and what provisions are included in the memorandum or other document establishing the operation. Those provisions constitute a minimum guarantee of the security of the human rights operation. Even if not specifically guaranteed by treaty, agreement, or other instrument, the human rights operation should in any case expect that the Government will ensure protection for the security of all staff, offices, records, vehicles, and other property of the operation.
4. In addition, in 1994 the UN General Assembly adopted a Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (2) which required ratifying governments to take all appropriate measures to ensure the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel. UN personnel include military, police, or civilian components of a UN operation deployed by the UN Secretary-General. Associated personnel include persons deployed by humanitarian nongovernmental organizations working under an agreement with the UN Secretary-General. If UN or associated personnel are captured or detained in the course of the performance of their duties, they shall not be subject to interrogation and shall be promptly released and returned to UN or other appropriate authorities. Pending their release they shall be treated in accordance with the principles and spirits of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The Convention does not apply to UN enforcement actions authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII in which any personnel are engaged as combatants against organized armed forces.
5. The Convention establishes universal criminal jurisdiction and a duty to extradite in regard to persons who commit attacks or attempted attacks upon UN and associated personnel. The Convention was opened for signature and ratification after 31 December 1995 and will come into force 30 days after twenty-two nations ratify it.
C. Security within a human rights field operation
6. Despite these international legal protections, security questions arise and the protections are not fully respected. Indeed, there have been a number of attacks on UN, ICRC, and other international personnel which indicate risks in some countries that must be taken into account. Accordingly, the human rights operation as a whole has an obligation to take steps to ensure the security of its staff members and can take a number of steps to avoid or pre-empt any incidents. Ultimately, however, each individual HRO will be the person best placed to ensure his or her own security. As a general rule individuals should try as far as possible to rely on themselves.
7. This chapter provides guidelines on efforts that the operation central office and individual HROs can take to minimize any security risk. "Security" is taken here to mean the physical security of HROs, including health, and the security of property, belonging both to the officer and to the United Nations.
8. The security situation will be different in each country or each region within the country. The United Nations has defined a number of general security situations in which certain restrictions are imposed on UN staff members operating in the area:
Phase I: Normal/stable
Phase II: Precautionary (movements should be restricted to essential activity)
Phase III: Restricted movement (all movements should be restricted)
Phase IV: Relocation (personnel should be relocated to specific centres in anticipation of a possible evacuation)
Phase V: Program suspension (regular operations cannot continue; all non- essential personnel will be evacuated)
Phase VI: Evacuation (all operations halted; all personnel evacuated)
9. These security phases have been developed by the UN for all activities, but they are applicable to UN human rights field operations. Countries that are designated as UN phase I are considered to be "family duty stations" and UN staff members may be accompanied by family or friends. At the beginning of an operation the director of the human rights field operation should verify the UN phase applied to the country of operation. In some situations several different phases may be applied to different areas of the same country.
2. Appointment of security officers
10. Every field operation should have a security officer, responsible, under the director, for all security matters within the operation. This person should have experience in dealing with security issues within conflict situations, and should be able to anticipate the evolution of a security situation so as to take preventive, rather than solely reactive, measures. The security officer should develop contacts with any Government forces towards ensuring the safety of the operation's staff and will be responsible for advising the direction of any necessary security measures.
11. In larger field operations, with various area offices, it can be useful to appoint a security officer from among the staff of each office. This person will be given responsibility for security issues within the team (along with his/her other duties) and for coordinating with the central security officer. The security officer should serve as a repository for security information gathered by other HROs and should consult individuals in the locality who are likely to know about risks to security and how they might be avoided.
12. Every HRO joining a field operation should be provided with detailed security guidelines written for that particular operation. In addition, an oral security briefing should be given by the security officer, upon arrival of new HROs.
13. The security guidelines and briefing should contain all relevant information on the recent and current security situation within the region and, where possible, the likely evolution of that situation. Each HRO should be aware of the principal threats to their safety (such as mines, armed bandits, general crime, illness, etc.) and the regions in which those threats are most likely to occur. Before entering a new area or neighborhood, HROs should consult the operation's central office or field security officer about risks; it is also advisable to consult others in the locality who may be informed of risks and how to avoid them. Generally, people who live in the locality will be the best informed of risks they must encounter every day.
14. The security officer should develop a means of collecting information from around the country/region on security-related incidents. This information should be circulated to all staff members as soon as possible and be regularly updated.
15. It is essential that staff be provided with all of the necessary information that will enable them to make an accurate assessment of the security situation.
4. Identification and visibility of HROs
16. United Nations human rights operations will usually have an impartial role. A key aspect of the protection of HROs will be ensuring that they are easily identifiable as UN HROs. To this end, vehicles should be clearly marked with stickers or flags that identify their occupants with the operation.
17. HROs themselves should always carry identification cards issued either by the operation or by the Government. It is also useful for any identification card used by staff members to provide medical information such as the blood type, allergies, counter-indicated medication, etc., of the bearer, in the event of accident.
18. In addition, it may be useful to wear clothing, such as a hat, arm band, shirt, or jacket which indicates clearly that the HRO is working with the UN, and which can provide easy identification from a distance. Where relevant, these items should be made available by the UN in Geneva or New York.
19. A radio communications network can be a very important factor in adding to the security of the members of field operations. It can also facilitate enormously the everyday functioning of the operation. The availability of radio communications means that HROs are independent of any local telephone communications network which may not function adequately and which may be monitored by the authorities. (Of course, mail, telephone, and radio communications may be monitored by the authorities and by armed opposition groups. Hence, HROs should avoid using the radio to discuss matters which should be kept confidential, unless there is an emergency.)
20. It is strongly advised that a radio communications or mobile telephone network be used in field operations and that it be extended to cover the whole region of operations. HROs can be provided with radio handsets or mobile telephones and their vehicles and offices can be equipped with long distance base stations. For security reasons it is essential that new staff members be issued with radios and temporary call signs immediately after their arrival in the country of operation. All staff members should be given training in how to use the radio, and in the specific language common to this form of communication. This precaution is particularly important where the human rights operation shares a radio channel with other organizations. Along with access to a vehicle, a radio is often the most important security device that a HRO has.
21. A Radio Unit (operations centre) should be established, from which a radio operator can monitor the movements of each HRO. Such a system helps to guarantee that in an emergency help can be sent to any staff member with a minimum of delay. A number of national staff can be employed as radio operators to ensure that there is 24-hour coverage where necessary.
22. The security of the offices and private residences of staff members is particularly important with regard to the security of property (see below), but can also be important in terms of personal security. Some HROs have chosen their places of residence in minority communities or in other places where people are at risk in order to give an extra reassurance of protection to the neighbours. (3) Others have avoided such locations because they might invite attack and might be generally less secure. The security officer and individual HROs will need to assess this question in the context they find themselves. In any case, the entrance to the offices and residences should be controlled, with visitors passing through one entrance. Where possible a second entrance/exit should be made available to be used only by staff members in the event of an emergency.
23. The security of offices is also important in regard to the documents, records, and computerized information which may be lost by theft or destruction. The loss of information may endanger the lives and security of many individuals. Hence, locked files and passwords on computer systems are strongly recommended. Computerized files at an area office should be systematically copied and placed in an even more secure location, for example, at the operation central office, or even in a bank vault. Given the risk of theft, computer malfunction, or fire, such back-up computer files can help safeguard the work product and the functioning of the operation.
24. Particularly with regard to residences, there should be locks on all of the outside doors of the building and on several of the inside doors. If there are people who wish to attack the house, they will probably be able to break any locks. The objective, however, is to delay them as long as possible. Locks within the building can help to delay intruders and will provide greater time for help to arrive. In the event of an attack on a residence, HROs should immediately call for help and then leave their radio switched on at full volume so that the attackers know that help is on its way. This tactic may discourage intruders.
25. Every residence should have a stock of water and food for at least seven days, that may be used in emergencies. HROs should try to meet their neighbours when they first move into their residence, so that help may be sought if needed. The residences of other members of the international community in the area should be identified.
26. The location of each office and residence used by area offices should be indicated to the operation's security officer and a number assigned to each building for rapid identification. Appendix 1 "Personal Data Form" is a form on which the HRO should indicate his/her place of abode and other personal details which will be useful in case of an emergency. The security officer and the area coordinator should have copies of the form and should know how to find all of these locations in an emergency.
7. Road blocks and other contacts with armed groups
27. HROs often work in situations where there are soldiers or other armed groups operating. It may be necessary to pass through road blocks or to make access to particular regions. Other than carrying identification, it can also be useful to carry a copy of any agreement signed by national or local authorities which guarantees safe passage throughout the territory. These documents should be available in relevant languages.
28. In dealing with road blocks and similar impediments, it is important to remain calm, not to appear nervous, and to avoid being provoked into an angry reaction. It is sometimes important not to appear too weak and thus not to agree immediately to any restrictions imposed by armed people. It may be useful to explain the mandate of the operation, show the agreement or other authorizing document, and indicate that it is important for the effective functioning of the operation that access be provided. At other times it will be important to obey instructions to the letter. These are situations in which HROs will have to judge for themselves how best to react. More specific advice based upon local experience can be provided in the country of operations.
29. Mines are indiscriminate and can be the biggest threat to the safety of HROs. If there are mines in the country of operation, this information should be included in the security guidelines provided to HROs upon arrival in the operation, along with details of the type and specifications of the mines used. Where possible, a mine briefing should be organized allowing HROs to see examples of the mines in use.
30. Mines can remain dangerous for many years and even a country presently at peace may still be under a significant threat from mines. In general, mines and unexploded bombs are found in zones where heavy combat has taken place at some point in the past. Mines are, however, sometimes placed in non-conflict areas with the specific intention of causing harm to civilians.
31. There are a number of precautions that can be taken to protect people from the blast of mine explosions, including the use of blast blankets in vehicles. The utility of these precautions depends on the type of mines used, and on the weight of the vehicles used. These precautions rarely provide complete protection and as a general rule operations should be suspended in areas where mines are known to have been placed.
32. Vehicles are the principal means of security that HROs have. A vehicle allows staff to leave dangerous security situations immediately without depending on any one else for assistance. It is also the principal means by which a HRO will travel around the country.
33. A key aspect of security for HROs is the maintenance and protection of the vehicles they use. Vehicle maintenance should usually be done by experienced mechanics, but there are a number of basic precautions that every HRO, to whom a vehicle is assigned, should take.
34. Even when a national driver is employed, HROs should themselves check the oil and water levels in the engine. They should check the amount of fuel in the tanks. As far as possible the fuel reservoir should be kept full and spare cans of fuel kept in the vehicle. Headlights should be checked, along with the condition of tyres. Every vehicle should always have at least one spare tyre (preferably two) and the equipment to change the tyre. All HROs should be able to change a tyre on their own. Every vehicle should have a map of the principal roads in the region.
35. As many HROs as possible should be able to drive, so that they can assist in emergency situations. HROs driving UN vehicles should make sure that they carry the necessary UN documents (such as a UN driver's licence) which authorize them to use the vehicle. When driving, national speed limits should be rigorously respected.
36. Field operations may be conducted in places where the road conditions are very poor and there is no lighting for night driving. For example, road surfaces may be uneven with pot holes and cracks; there may be no signposts warning of hazards such as bends in the road, potential rockfalls, or ice. Much driving may be conducted on tracks with no artificial road surface. Training should be given to HROs in using four-wheel-drive gear systems and how to handle the different road surfaces and weather conditions (dry and dusty, very wet and muddy, snow, etc.).
37. It is important to remember that other drivers in the region may not have had any formal training in how to drive. They may not be aware of any highway code or standard procedures that are in use in other countries. In addition, the other vehicles on the road may be very poorly maintained. Such devices as turning indicators, windscreen wipers, and brakes may not function adequately on other vehicles. HROs should be wary of other vehicles on the road.
38. Pedestrians, particularly in many developing countries, are forced to use roads to walk from one place to another. The majority of these people will never have driven a vehicle themselves, are unaware of how difficult it can be for drivers to see them, and so do not always take adequate precautions. When using a road employed by large numbers of pedestrians, it is often dangerous to drive immediately behind another vehicle. Pedestrians, will only hear the first vehicle, whose noise obscures that of the second, and often step out into the road as soon as the first one has passed.
39. HROs should be very careful when driving. Other drivers and pedestrians can be very unpredictable and accidents happen extremely quickly.
11. General dress and behaviour restrictions
40. Some security incidents are created when a HRO does something to offend local people. Often unintentional, these incidents can be avoided through sufficient attention to the local situation. Some countries, for example, may have restrictions on dress, for religious or other reasons. These restrictions are usually less strictly applied to foreigners than to nationals; however, HROs should make sure that they observe the minimum standards. It is important that guidelines be provided on local customs and things to do and not to do. Photography, for example, is often a sensitive point and staff members should avoid taking photographs, for whatever purpose, in front of Government buildings, airports, bridges, border crossings, military installations, or of soldiers and their vehicles.
41. In the context of a changing security situation, the direction of the field operation may choose to impose certain travel restrictions. Typically, those restrictions would involve limiting travel at night and requiring that HROs travel in pairs. In some situations it may be necessary for vehicles to travel in convoys. A radio communications network for the operation can allow the use of a check in/check out system whereby HROs leaving one location for another are required to inform the radio operator when they leave for a set destination and when they arrive. In this way the movements of HROs can be monitored and the location of each individual checked. As a rule, staff deployed to area offices should always make sure that their colleagues in the office know of their location at all times.
13. Emergency plans, knowing where to go
42. Every HRO should know what to do in the event of an escalation in the security situation. In particular, staff members should be given a list of several places to which they should go once a signal is given. It is important that an emergency plan provide several alternatives to HROs, in the event that one particular route is unusable. HROs should make sure that they know the way to these locations, particularly in the dark.
43. Emergency plans focus on getting staff members away from life-threatening situations as quickly as is possible. Often such exit plans will mean trying to cross an international border out of the country or assembling at one of several points within the country at which security may be guaranteed, such as an airport.
44. Emergency contingency plans should be defined by the direction of the operation and the security officer, and should usually be developed in close collaboration with other humanitarian operations in the area.
45. There are a number of precautions that can be taken with regard to health security. At the beginning of a field operation the needs assessment for the operation should anticipate the medical needs of staff members and should identify the medical facilities available in the region (doctors, hospitals). If the local facilities are not adequate, provision should be made for medivac (medical evacuation) arrangements in the case of an emergency, allowing staff members to be transferred by air to another country where better medical facilities are available.
46. HROs should ensure that they have received the various medical vaccinations for the region and that those vaccinations, such as hepatitis, which require a series of injections over a period of months, are duly updated. Many regions of the world have problems with malaria and staff should take prophylactics, at least for the first few months following arrival. Information should be provided on whether or not tap water can be consumed and on the cleanliness of fresh food sold locally.
47. Every HRO should receive written guidelines on the prevalent illnesses or other dangers to health, in the region. They should avoid unnecessary health risks, e.g., sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS. They should be told how to recognize the symptoms of those illnesses in themselves or in their colleagues, and of what to do in the event of an emergency. Cerebral malaria, for example, is not uncommon in East Africa and can lead to death within 48 hours if not treated within the first day. Illness or accident as a result of psychological stress can occur in field operations, and staff should be familiar with the early indicators of this condition.
48. It is highly recommended that the members of a field operation be given first aid training relevant to the security situation in which they will be working. Each area office and every vehicle should be equipped with a medical kit and HROs should be familiar with its contents.
49. UN staff members are insured for the theft or damage of their personal property and should ask the administrative officer of the operation for details on the particular insurance coverage from which they benefit. Such advice is important as the insurance policy may have a number of exclusion clauses (see below).
50. Care should be taken to keep valuable property (cameras, tape recorders, personal computers, etc.) locked away when not in use. Items should not be left in a vehicle as car locks are easily opened. HROs should use these items, and their cash, discreetly, in part to avoid offending the sensibilities of local people that may not be able to afford them, and in part to avoid attracting thieves. Each vehicle should be parked in the safest possible location or, if necessary, kept under surveillance.
51. In the event of an emergency evacuation, staff members may be required to leave behind the majority of their belongings. In order to facilitate subsequent compensation claims each staff member should be asked to complete an inventory of his or her belongings (see the example in Appendix 2 "Inventory of Personal Belongings"). This inventory should be sent to the organization's Headquarters in Geneva or New York.
52. HROs will be given the use of UN property. Most notably, HROs may use UN vehicles and laptop computers. The operation should reconfirm that these items are routinely insured for damage and theft. The insurance policy used by the UN requires that the operation administration carry out an assessment of possible negligence on the part of the person using the equipment. There are several degrees of negligence and each one requires that the person deemed responsible becomes liable for a maximum amount. In the case of the theft or damage of a vehicle, for example, this amount can be US$10,000. Negligence may be found if, for example, a vehicle was stolen while being used after a UN curfew and for non-work related activities. It may be quite unwise in some contexts to use UN vehicles at night for non-work related social activities.
53. HROs should be informed, upon arrival in a field operation, of the specific rules involved in assessing negligence. In any case, care should be taken in the use and maintenance of all UN property. Regardless of liability issues, it may be some time before the operation is able to replace stolen or damaged equipment and the work of HROs will suffer without it.
54. As discussed above, it is the responsibility of HROs to respect security guidelines, to keep informed of the security situation, to exercise good judgement, and to be careful.
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1. United Nations,
New York, 1998.
2. U.N. G.A. res. A/49/59 of 9 December 1994, 49 GAOR (Supp. No. 1) at 299, annex (1994).
3. See Diane Paul, Beyond Monitoring and Reporting, Strategies for the Field-level Protection of Civilians Under Threat (1996).